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Introduction
Carry trades are investments where investors borrow from low interest rate capital markets and invest in high yield markets to profit from the interest rate differential. Investors take the risk of devaluation of the investment currency. The volume of these speculative investments increased substantially in emerging markets prior to the 2007-8 financial crisis. Especially
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) attracted a surge of un-hedged cross-border investment and lending. As this involves the purchase of assets using foreign currency, carry trades might have contributed to asset market booms in CEE (Galati et al., 2007) . My contribution to the literature is twofold. First, I test the main determinants found in the carry trade literature for the CEE economies. Here, I follow the idea of Minsky (1986) that risk-taking is most pronounced in an upswing of a business cycle. Therefore, in contrast to previous studies, I distinguish between boom and bust in my analysis. Second, I discuss whether exchange rate strategies in CEE affect carry trade returns. To my knowledge the impact of the exchange rate regime has not yet been examined in the carry trade literature.
The paper is organized as follows. I start with an explanation of carry trades and analyze excess returns and risks of carry trades to CEE from 1999 to 2009. Then I investigate determinants of carry trades. I find that liquidity conditions, interest rate differentials, risk appetite and exchange rate stability fuel carry trade returns (and therefore short-term asset markets). The last section concludes.
Carry Trades and Exchange Rate Risk
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity and Carry Trade Returns
There are two prominent ways of carry trading. First, investors borrow from a low interest rate capital market and invest in a (mostly) short-term asset (bank deposits, government papers or risky assets such as stocks) in high yield markets to seek for arbitrage profits that stem from the interest rate differential. As long as the investment currency does not depreciate against the funding currency profits are positive (Galati et al., 2007) .
A second strategy is to exploit the forward premium (Brunnermeier et. al., 2009; Burnside et al., 2009) . This is the difference between the forward exchange rate and the spot exchange rate of two currencies. If a currency is assumed to depreciate against another currency because the forward rate is higher than the spot rate, it has a forward premium and is likely to be sold or becoming the funding currency. Contrary, if a currency is assumed to appreciate having a forward exchange rate that is below the spot exchange rate, it has a forward discount and may become the target of investors. This is then the investment currency.
Both strategies lead to similar outcomes. Currencies with low interest rates should have a forward premium and currencies with high interest rates should have a forward discount for the carry trade to be lucrative. Then borrowing in currencies with low interest rates and lending in currencies with high interest rates is similar to buying currencies at a forward discount and selling them on forward premium.
Carry trades are commonly used by hedge funds and other financial institutions in form of leveraged portfolios to make high short-term profits (Galati and Melvin, 2004 Empirically UIP can hold in the long-run (Flood and Rose, 2002; Chinn and Meredith, 2004) . But many studies found that in the short-run excess returns are possible and UIP fails (Flood and Rose, 2002; McBrady, 2005) . In fact, high-yielding currencies often appreciate against low-yielding currencies. Thus, currency carry trades can bring about excess returns.
Empirically carry trade returns are even positive on average. This is referred to as forward premium puzzle in the carry trade literature (Burnside et al., 2009 (Galati et al., 2007; Saunders, 2007; and Rosenberg and Tirpak, 2008 ' being the mean of exchange rate changes in the quarter, s the standard deviation of daily changes, and T the total number of daily exchange rate changes in the quarter.
Symmetric data, e.g. which is normally distributed, would have a skewness of zero. Thus the average and median of exchange rate changes is equal. A negative skewness implies that a currency appreciates over a long time while depreciations are less common. Exchange rate developments that are negatively skewed are said to "go up by the stairs and come down by the elevator" (Brunnermeier et al., 2009, p. 327) . Therefore investment may be profitable for a long time, while a risk of sudden depreciation is at hands. country-specific unobserved heterogeneity in CEE. 4 The regression takes the form Table 2 shows the impact of the interest rate differential on carry trade returns in W periods ahead. The coefficients f b 1 on the interest rate differential are positive and significant as indicated by the standard errors in parentheses. Following UIP the coefficients should be zero or insignificant. However, the data suggests that interest rate differentials are on average positive predictors for CHF and EUR carry trade returns for up to one year with respect to the euro area interest rate, and up to nine months with respect to the Swiss interest rate. This is a violation of UIP. Thus, interest rate spreads to the euro area and Switzerland made purchases of CEE assets (bonds, stocks, equity) using CHF or EUR more lucrative than using CEE currencies.
There are three plausible explanations. First, the CEE economies were expected to catch-up to the EU, which typically goes along with a productivity-driven appreciation of their currencies (DeGrauwe and Schnabl, 2005) . Second, many CEE countries intervene in the foreign exchange rate market to stabilize exchange rates against the EUR . Hence, investors did not expect sharp depreciations over this period. And third, Swiss and EMU nominal interest rates (and inflation) were relatively low from 2002 to 2006.
In this respect, Hoffmann and Schnabl (2011) and Hoffmann (2010) argue that easy monetary policies in advanced economies contributed to buoyant capital inflows and investment booms in emerging market economies which caused an appreciation of their currencies. As higher inflation in CEE prevented nominal interest rates to fully converge with the capital inflows, an interest rate spread remained, which made the carry trade lucrative.
Following Brunnermeier et al. (2009) In times of financial distress when risk-taking is depressed and investors face losses in financial markets (e.g. the recent financial crisis), the reallocation of capital restricts funding on markets (Minsky, 1986) . Then, carry trade unwinds and short-term assets are sold (Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Clarida et al., 2009 investors anticipate large movements in the S&P 500 in either direction until 1 t (which is a month later). Investors actively hedge (via sell and put options) expected market volatility so that option price volatility and with it the VIX increase. Therefore, the VIX is considered an index for expected financial market (volatility) risk. It is referred to as fear index (Brunnermeier et al., 2009 ). The VIX is only low when investors perceive neither significant downside risk nor significant upside potential in the S&P. Then US markets are relatively stable.
Although the VIX seems to be unrelated to the markets in CEE, previous studies have
shown that it is a good indicator for global risk-taking on equity as well as credit markets (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001 ). The indicator rises in periods of financial turbulences and crisis such as the Russian flu of 1998 and is highly correlated with the risk premium in sovereign credit default swaps (Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Pan and Singleton, 2008) . The rationale for using this measure is that an increase in expected US financial market volatility spills over to other markets, e.g. the euro area or Switzerland or a common factor drives volatility in both markets. When US markets hike or fall, capital redemption restricts funding of investment elsewhere.
The reasoning is as follows. Assuming a carry trader holds an investment currency in form of a short-term asset, a rise in expected financial market volatility as expressed by an increase of the VIX creates uncertainty in markets and leads to asset sales. On the one hand, when stark increases of the S&P are expected, CEE investment may be less lucrative relative to e.g. US investment. On the other hand, when the S&P is expected to fall sharply, this signals a possible crisis and drying up liquidity.
Therefore, a higher VIX signals depressed risk appetite in international financial markets. Investors reassess the profitability of investment projects and lenders restrict funding (especially when financial markets anticipate a downside risk). Then capital flows to CEE can reverse and foreign borrowing in CEE is restricted. Carry trades unwind. This can trigger a devaluation of the CEE currency and losses from carry trades. Thus, carry trades unwind endogenously as a result of reallocation and reorganization of investment projects in the market. The building up of carry trade during periods of easy liquidity conditions is followed by a crash when liquidity conditions dry up because risk appetite in financial markets is depressed.
Following Minsky (1986)'s "theory of financial instability" risk appetite of financial markets is particularly pronounced during the upswing of a business cycle. Therefore, risky investment such as carry trades has to be related to the business cycle. Returns are large when the country with the investment currency is in the upswing of a business cycle or the country with the funding currency experiences a bust. In both cases funding interest rates are relatively low and interest rate differentials are high (Clarida et al., 2009 ).
Therefore, it is sensible to distinguish different periods in the analysis. To do so, (Figure 1 ). When risk appetite is high, funding conditions are loose and carry trade returns rise. Financing CEE assets using foreign currency was profitable.
In the bust period, expected financial market volatility increased. Thus, the coefficient I explain this finding as follows. During the boom period, when risk-appetite in financial markets was pronounced and interest rate differentials had a large impact on the returns, particularly with regard to the euro area, capital inflows appreciated some CEE currencies against the funding currencies. Exchange rate volatility allowed for higher returns.
CEE assets were more lucrative for carry traders. However, during the period of financial turmoil from 2007-2009, risks and uncertainty about returns increased (Figure 1 ). When capital was withdrawn from the CEE countries (assets were sold), this depreciated the CEE currencies and had a negative impact on carry trade returns.
Therefore, large exchange rate swings are associated with a dismantling of carry trades (Clarida et al., 2009) . This suggests that the exchange rate regime may be an institutional determinant for carry trades returns in CEE. Indeed, holding other variables constant, more stable exchange rates to the funding currencies allowed for larger average carry trade returns overall ( This does not imply a higher volume of carry trades because countries with fixed exchange rates allowed for safe returns. In the latest crisis, fixed exchange rates helped secure returns and made carry trades more profitable as exchange rates could not depreciate. Thus, investors that bought e.g. safe Estonian assets financed in foreign currency did not face devaluation losses. Larger returns per unit went along with increased crash risk due to exchange rate misalignments in countries with flexible exchange rates. The more flexible the exchange rates, the smaller the returns during the crisis (Figure 4 ).
The analysis makes sense in the context of the descriptive statistics presented in Table   1 . While the average returns on carry trade are the highest for countries with flexible exchange rates (PL) and managed floats (HU, RO, SK), the Sharpe ratios are high for managed floaters (HU, SK, RO) and countries with fixed exchange rates (EE, LT).
Summary
In this study, I have analyzed determinants of currency carry trade in CEE. The study is supportive to the empirical findings of Clarida et al. (2009) and Brunnermeier et al. (2009) . I have presented a robust empirical relationship between carry trade excess returns, interest rate spreads, risk-taking and exchange rate volatility during the boom period. In particular, I have documented that carry trades built up due to high interest rate spreads and risk appetite. The unwinding can be explained by a fear of financial market distress (depressed risk-taking) and funding constraints. Exchange rate stability increased carry trade returns overall, while the effect stems from the period when global financial turmoil and exchange rate volatility deteriorate carry trade returns.
Further, I have provided evidence of that CEE countries with credibly fixed exchanges rates against the euro as well as countries with managed floats allowed for larger carry trade returns. In line with this, the Sharpe ratios for countries with managed floats and fixed exchange rates are higher than for countries with flexible exchange rates. The combination of a safety net, e.g. interventions in case depreciation and large interest rate spreads made carry trades profitable for both investments in anchor currency and third currencies (Swiss franc).
Volatility was low but returns were high. In the latest crisis, fixed exchange rates helped secure returns and made carry trades from e.g. Switzerland more lucrative as exchange rate stability was more or less guaranteed. Therefore the exchange rate regime is likely to be an institutional determinant of carry trades. Further research is necessary to explore the impact of different exchange rate arrangements on carry trade profitability and activity.
Following Galati et al, (2007) carry trades to CEE were often initiated by households and private investors and included the purchase of an asset denominated in a CEE currency.
Therefore, given its high profitability and the favorable conditions in the boom period, it is likely that carry trades fuelled the lucrative CEE asset markets in the run-up to the latest crisis. 
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